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LEGISLATION
SOUTH AFRICAN POST OFFICE SOC LTD AMENDMENT ACT 38 OF
2013
Section 5 and the Schedule to the South African Post Office
SOC Ltd Amendment Act 38 of 2013, amend the Post and
Telecommunication-related Matters Act 44 of 1958 (formerly the
Post Office Act 44 of 1958). In terms of the amendments, the
pension interest of a member of the Post Office Retirement Fund
is deemed to be part of his or her assets on divorce, and the
non-member spouse’s share of the pension interest can be paid
to the non-member after divorce. These amendments bring the
position in respect of the Post Office Retirement Fund in line with
that which applies to pension funds falling under the Pension
Funds Act 24 of 1956 and the Government Employees Pension
Law, 1996. The Amendment Act, which arose from the order of
unconstitutionality made in Ngewu v Post Office Retirement Fund
2013 (4) BCLR 421 (CC), came into operation on 27 January
2014 (Proc 53 GG 37269 of 27 January 2014). Ngewu and its
sequel, which probably hastened the coming into operation of
the Amendment Act, are discussed below.
JUDICIAL MATTERS AMENDMENT ACT 42 OF 2013
Section 42 of the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 42 of 2013
corrects the reference to the year of the Reform of Customary
Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of
2009 (‘the Act’) in s 3(2) and (3) of the Act, by substituting 2008
with 2009. In terms of s 43(2) of the Amendment Act, s 42 is
deemed to have come into operation on 20 September 2010 – the
date on which the Act came into operation.
* BLC LLB (UP) LLM (Unisa), Professor of Law in the Department of Private Law,
University of South Africa. This material is based on work supported financially by
the National Research Foundation. Any opinion, findings and conclusions or recom-
mendations expressed in this material are those of the author and therefore the NRF
does not accept any liability in regard thereto. This survey is partly based on
contributions previously published in the 2013 Juta Quarterly Review.
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SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
In May 2013, the Department of Justice and Constitutional
Development called for public comment on the draft Voluntary
Court-Annexed Mediation Rules of the Magistrates’ Courts (http:
//www.justice.gov.za/legislation/invitations/invite-mediation.html,
accessed 31 January 2014; the draft rules are available in all
official languages by way of different links at this address). In so
far as family law is concerned, the rules will apply to mediation in
the children’s courts and regional courts which have jurisdiction
in divorce matters. The preamble indicates that the rules will be
implemented on a pilot basis.
DRAFT LEGISLATION
JUDICIAL MATTERS AMENDMENT BILL 7 OF 2013
The Judicial Matters Amendment Bill 7 of 2013 became the
Judicial Matters Amendment Act, which is discussed above.
SOUTH AFRICAN POST OFFICE SOC LTD AMENDMENT BILL 24 OF
2013
The South African Post Office SOC Ltd Amendment Bill 24 of
2013 became the South African Post Office SOC Ltd Amendment
Act, which is discussed above.
DRAFT CHILDREN’S AMENDMENT BILL, 2013, AND DRAFT CHILDREN’S
SECOND AMENDMENT BILL, 2013
On 15 November 2013, the Department of Social Development
published notices indicating that the Minister of Social Develop-
ment intended tabling the Children’s Amendment Bill and the
Children’s SecondAmendment Bill in Parliament during 2014 and
inviting comments on the draft Bills (General Notices 1105
and 1106 GG 37014 of 15 November 2013). Some of the clauses
in the draft Bills seek to give effect to the order of the Constitu-
tional Court in C and Others v Department of Health and Social
Development, Gauteng and Others 2012 (2) SA 208 (CC) (see
2012 Annual Survey 336), which declared certain provisions of
the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (‘the Act’) that deal with the removal
of children into care, unconstitutional. Clauses 4 to 6 of the draft
Children’s Amendment Bill provide for judicial review of the
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removal of a child into temporary safe care without a court order,
while clause 2 of the draft Children’s Second Amendment Bill
imposes additional duties on designated social workers who
have placed children in temporary safe care without a court
order. Clause 3(b) of the draft Children’s Amendment Bill amends
the definition of a ‘child in need of care’ in keeping with the
interpretation of s 150(1)(a) of the Act in SS v Presiding Officer,
Children’s Court, Krugersdorp 2012 (6) SA 45 (GSJ) (see 2012
Annual Survey 338). Clause 1(a) of the draft Children’s Second
Amendment Bill further substitutes the definition of ‘adoption
social worker’ in s 1 of the Act; clause 4 empowers the provincial
head of social development to transfer a child from one type of
alternative care to another; and clauses 3, 5 and 6 amend the
provisions of the Act on the duration of alternative care orders.
Another draft Children’s Amendment Bill, 2013, and a memo-
randum setting out the objectives of this draft Bill were published
for public comment in February (GN 164 GG 36196 of 27 Febru-
ary 2013). This draft Bill added persons who have been con-
victed of attempted rape to the category of persons who are
disqualified from working with children. The provisions of this
draft Bill were not included in the draft Children’s Amendment Bill
or the draft Second Children’s Amendment Bill referred to above.
CASE LAW
BREACH OF PROMISE
In Cloete v Maritz 2013 (5) SA 448 (WCC), C sued M for breach
of promise to marry. M raised a special plea in which he
contended that breach of promise is no longer a valid cause of
action. The special plea was based on statements by the
Supreme Court of Appeal in Van Jaarsveld v Bridges 2010 (4) SA
558 (SCA) regarding the abolition of the claim for contractual
damages based on breach of promise. M contended that these
statements were binding, while C countered that they were obiter
remarks and that the court was bound to apply the common-law
rule that breach of promise is actionable.
Referring to the fact that the judgment in Van Jaarsveld was
squarely based on the court’s conclusion that Ms Bridges had
failed to prove sufficient facts to support her claim, Henney J
correctly held that the statements in that judgment about the
abolition of the claim for contractual damages for breach of
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promise had been obiter. Consequently, they were not binding
although they had strong persuasive force (paras [38], [40],
[47]). He reiterated the views in Sepheri v Scanlan 2008 (1) SA
322 (C) and Van Jaarsveld that the values underlying the
Constitution require that breach of promise be reconsidered in
the light of prevailing mores and public policy (para [41]). He
pointed out that the courts are obliged to develop the common
law and to have regard to prevailing mores and public policy
when doing so (para [42]). He further pointed out that the boni
mores and public policy are not static concepts and are con-
stantly evolving (para [44]). He concluded that the rule that a
party who breaks off an engagement can be held liable on a rigid
contractual footing does not reflect changed mores and public
interest and is untenable (paras [48]–[56]). Applying the reason-
ing and guidelines set out in Van Jaarsveld, he specifically held
that a claim for prospective losses is no longer allowed and that
pleadings based on such a claim do not reveal a valid cause of
action (para [56]). He accordingly upheld the special plea (paras
[57], [58]).
As pointed out by Henney J, the obiter views in Van Jaarsveld
are persuasive. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that the
judge decided to apply those views and to develop the common
law to abolish claims for contractual damages for breach of
promise.
CHILDREN
Adoption
In the first case on adoption during the period under review, In
re XN 2013 (6) SA 153 (GSJ), the High Court was faced with a
special review of an adoption order that had been made in the
absence of the letter recommending the child’s adoption required
in terms of s 239(1)(d) of the Children’s Act. The provincial
department of social development had failed to deliver the letter
and had indicated that it was not in a position to deliver it. The
children’s court had, in the best interests of the child, condoned
non-compliance with the requirement relating to the letter on the
grounds that the adoption social worker recommended the adop-
tion; the child did not know his biological father and had been
raised by his mother alone; the child supported the adoption and
was being adopted by his stepfather; and the stepfather, who had
been found to be a suitable adoptive parent, was returning to his
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home country of Trinidad and wanted his wife and her child to
accompany him. The High Court held that the requirement regard-
ing the letter is peremptory and that, as a rule, the children’s court
may not condone non-compliance with the requirement as condo-
nation would result in the objectives of the Act being negated
(paras [14], [19]). However, the exceptional circumstances of the
case required condonation in the best interests of the child (paras
[15], [19], [20], [22]). The High Court repeatedly emphasised that
condonation may be granted only in exceptional circumstances
(ibid). The decision is welcome for its emphasis on the best
interests of the child and for requiring exceptional circumstances
for condonation.
The second case, Centre for Child Law v Minister of Social
Development [2013] ZAGPPHC 305 (30 October 2013) (subse-
quently reported at 2014 (1) SA 468 (GNP)), concerns whether a
stepparent may adopt the child of his or her spouse, civil union
partner or permanent life partner, and whether the child’s parent
who is the stepparent’s spouse, civil union partner or permanent
life partner automatically loses his or her parental responsibilities
and rights in the case of such an adoption.
In terms of s 230(1)(b) of the Children’s Act, a child may not be
adopted unless he or she is adoptable. Section 230(3) provides
that a child is adoptable if
(a) the child is an orphan and has no guardian or caregiver who is
willing to adopt the child;
(b) the whereabouts of the child’s parent or guardian cannot be
established;
(c) the child has been abandoned;
(d) the child’s parent or guardian has abused or deliberately
neglected the child, or has allowed the child to be abused or
deliberately neglected; or
(e) the child is in need of a permanent alternative placement.
In several instances, officials at the children’s courts had
turned away stepparents who wanted to adopt the children of
their spouses, civil union partners or life partners. The officials
were of the view that children living with their biological parents in
a safe environment did not fall within the scope of s 230(3) and
could, as a result, not be adopted. The officials further believed
that an adoption order in favour of a stepparent would automati-
cally terminate the parental responsibilities and rights of the
child’s biological parent because s 242(1)(a) provides that an
adoption order terminates ‘all parental responsibilities and rights
any person, including a parent, step-parent or partner in a
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domestic life partnership, had in respect of the child immediately
before the adoption’. The Centre for Child Law approached the
High Court for an order declaring that: (a) s 230(3) does not
preclude a child from being adoptable if he or she has a guardian
and the person who seeks to adopt the child is the guardian’s
spouse or permanent life partner; and (b) s 242 does not
automatically terminate all the parental responsibilities and rights
of the child’s guardian in the case of such an adoption. In the
alternative, the Centre sought an order declaring that: (a)
s 230(3) is inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the
extent that it precludes a child from being adoptable in instances
where the person seeking to adopt is the spouse or domestic life
partner of the child’s guardian; and (b) s 242(1) is inconsistent
with the Constitution to the extent that it automatically terminates
all parental responsibilities and rights of the guardian of a child
whose spouse or permanent domestic life partner seeks to adopt
the child.
Louw J granted the main order. He held that in the case of a
stepparent adoption, the child can be adoptable in terms of
several of the subparagraphs of s 230(3). First, if the biological
parent with whom the child was not residing consented to the
child’s adoption, such parent must ‘be taken to have abandoned
the child as contemplated in s 230(3)(c)’. Louw J referred to the
definition of ‘abandoned’ in s 1, which reads
‘abandoned’, in relation to a child, means a child who —
(a) has obviously been deserted by the parent, guardian or care-
giver; or
(b) has, for no apparent reason, had no contact with the parent,
guardian, or care-giver for a period of at least three months; . . .
The judge pointed out that the definition does not require
abandonment by both parents (para [8]). Referring to the defini-
tion of ‘desert’ in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, he
concluded that a child is given up, relinquished, left, forsaken or
abandoned if the parent with whom the child does not reside
consents to the child’s adoption by his or her stepparent. If the
child has, for no apparent reason, not had contact with his or her
biological parent for at least three months, the child will, for that
reason too, be adoptable as envisaged in s 230(3)(c), regardless
of whether or not the parent consents to the adoption (paras [8],
[9], incorrectly numbered [3] in the transcript of the judgment,
and para [10], incorrectly numbered [4] in the transcript). If
the biological parent’s consent to the adoption has not been
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obtained on the basis of his or her whereabouts being unknown,
the child will be adoptable as envisaged in s 230(3)(b) as this
section does not require that the whereabouts of both parents
must be unknown (para [10], incorrectly numbered [4] in the
transcript).
Louw J correctly stated that his interpretation of s 230(3)(b)
and (c) finds support in s 231(1)(c) which expressly permits
stepparent adoptions and does not limit these adoptions to
situations where the biological parent with whom the child does
not reside is deceased (para [11], incorrectly numbered [5] in the
transcript). Approving the submission made by counsel for the
Centre for Child Law, he further held that if there were any doubt
as to whether the above view of s 230(3) was correct, the
Constitution favoured an interpretation of the section that permit-
ted stepparent adoptions, because such adoptions promote the
child’s right to family or parental care and serve the child’s best
interests (para [12], incorrectly numbered [6] in the transcript).
He therefore concluded that s 230(3) ‘does not preclude a child
from being adoptable merely because the child has a parent or
guardian who cares for the child and the person seeking to adopt
the child is the spouse or permanent domestic life partner of the
child’s parent or guardian’ (paras [13], [17] incorrectly numbered
[8] in the transcript).
Turning to the issue of whether a stepparent adoption automati-
cally terminates all parental responsibilities and rights of the
biological parent who is the stepparent’s spouse, civil union
partner or life partner, Louw J pointed out that s 242(1) empowers
the court to provide otherwise in the adoption order. As a result,
the children’s court has a discretion to order that the parental
responsibilities and rights of the child’s parent or guardian will not
terminate as a result of the adoption (para [14]). The judge held
that failing exceptional circumstances, it will be in the best
interests of the adopted child not to terminate the parental
responsibilities and rights of the biological parent who is the
stepparent’s spouse, civil union partner or life partner. As the
children’s court must promote the best interests of the child, it
should, ‘except where there are sound reasons not to do so,
make an order that the granting of an adoption order in favour of a
stepparent will not terminate the responsibilities and rights of the
child’s parent or other guardian’ (ibid).
It is hoped that children’s courts will apply the rule laid down by
Louw J diligently and will, in the absence of exceptional circum-
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stances, be careful not to omit a clause providing that the
adoption does not terminate the parental responsibilities and
rights of the child’s parent or other guardian.
Foster care
NM v Presiding Officer of Children’s Court, Krugersdorp and
Others 2013 (4) SA 379 (GSJ) (also reported as NCM and Others
v Presiding Officer of the Children’s Court, District of Krugersdorp
and Others [2013] 3 All SA 471 (GSJ)), deals with a similar issue
to the one that arose in SS v Presiding Officer, Children’s Court,
Krugersdorp (above).
In SS, an orphan was voluntarily being cared for by his aunt
and uncle. These caregivers sought to have the child declared in
need of care and protection in terms of s 150(1)(a) of the
Children’s Act, and to have him placed in their foster care in terms
of s 156(1)(e) so that they could access a foster care grant.
Section 150(1)(a) provides that a child is in need of care and
protection if he or she has been abandoned or orphaned and is
without visible means of support. Section 156(1)(e) provides that
a child who has been found to be in need of care and protection
can be placed in foster care if he or she has no parent or
caregiver, or has a parent or caregiver who is unable or unsuit-
able to care for him or her. The children’s court held that a child
who is being cared for voluntarily by a person who does not have
parental responsibilities and rights over him or her is not without
visible means of support, and is therefore not in need of care and
protection as envisaged by s 150(1)(a). Furthermore, because
such a child has a caregiver who is able and suitable to care for
him or her, a foster care order cannot be made in respect of the
child in terms of s 156(1)(e). The High Court overturned the
decision. It held that an orphaned or abandoned child who is
voluntarily being cared for by a caregiver who does not have a
common-law duty of support towards the child can be found to
be in need of care and protection. Consequently, such a child
may be placed in foster care with that caregiver and the
caregiver can receive a foster care grant. (On SS, see 2012
Annual Survey 338.)
In NM, the question arose whether orphaned children who
were being cared for by their grandmother could be found to be
in need of care and protection and could be placed in her foster
care. Like the children’s court in SS, the children’s court in NM
held that the children were not in need of care and protection as
they had visible means of support, and that a foster care order
432 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW
could not be issued because the children had a caregiver who
was able and suitable to care for them. An appeal was lodged
against the entire judgment of the children’s court.
On appeal, Carelse J first dealt with two preliminary issues.
Only the second issue is relevant to family law. It concerns the
question whether the commissioner of the children’s court should
have made an order that the children must have legal represen-
tation or, at the very least, should have informed the applicant
(the children’s grandmother) that she could approach Legal Aid
South Africa to obtain legal representation for the children.
Carelse J held that the commissioner was, at the very least,
obliged to inform the applicant that she could approach Legal Aid
South Africa (para [7]). However, she declined to set the pro-
ceedings aside on the ground of the commissioner’s failure to
comply with this duty, as it would not be in the interests of justice
to have the matter start anew in the children’s court. The resulting
delay would cause injustice in view of the conflicting orders that
had emanated from the children’s court as to the interpretation of
the relevant provisions of the Act (ibid). Furthermore, as the
outcome of the appeal in this case favoured the children’s
interests, the ‘substantial injustice’ which s 28(1)(h) of the Consti-
tution requires for the appointment of a legal practitioner for the
child by the state, at state expense, in civil proceedings, was
absent. Consequently, Carelse J concluded that it was unneces-
sary to appoint a legal representative for the children (ibid).
Regarding the main matter, the judge indicated that the
children’s court had relied on s 32 of the Children’s Act in holding
that there was no need to place the child in foster care. Section
32(1) provides that a person who does not have parental
responsibilities and rights in respect of a child, but who voluntar-
ily cares for the child indefinitely, temporarily or partially, must
safeguard the child’s health, wellbeing and development, and
protect the child from maltreatment, abuse, neglect, degradation,
discrimination, exploitation, or any other physical, emotional or
mental harm or hazards, whilst the child is in that person’s care.
As in SS (above), Carelse J dismissed this finding (paras [13],
[24]).
She further agreed with and applied the finding in SS that the
interpretation of s 150(1)(a) involves a two-stage enquiry: during
the first stage the court must determine whether the child has
been abandoned or orphaned. This stage consists of a factual
determination in which the reports of the social workers involved
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in the case must be considered. If it is revealed that the child has
indeed been abandoned or orphaned, the second stage comes
into play. During the second stage the court must determine
whether the child is without any visible means of support. In so
doing, the court must determine whether the child has his or her
own means of support, and if not, whether there is someone who
has a legal duty of support towards the child. This enquiry is also
factual and must focus on the personal financial resources of the
child instead of those of any person who may in fact be caring for
the child (SS paras [24], [28]–[31], [40], referred to in paras
[20]–[23] of NM).
Carelse J pointed out that NM could be distinguished from SS
on the facts, as the caregiver in SS did not owe a common-law
duty of support to the child, while NM dealt with a grandmother,
who did owe a common-law duty of support to her grandchildren
(paras [9], [24]). Therefore, in NM the question was whether a
caregiver who does owe such a duty of support to a child may be
appointed as the child’s foster parent and receive a foster care
grant (para [9]). Carelse J further indicated that interpreting the
statement in SS (para [29]) that ‘[a] child who has been orphaned
or abandoned, and who is living with a caregiver who does not
have a common-law duty of support towards such child, may be
placed in foster care with that caregiver’ in a way that excludes
caregivers who do have a common-law duty of support, would
create a distinction between various categories of children that
would cause untold hardship for children whose caregivers have
such a duty.
Section 150(1) makes no such distinction, nor does s 156(1)(e)
exclude certain caregivers on the ground of whether or not they
owe a duty of support to the children they wish to foster (paras
[24], [26]). Consequently, there can be no rational basis for the
distinction (para [26]). The judge also held that it would not be in
the best interests of the children in the present case to exclude
their grandmother as a potential foster parent (para [28]). More-
over, s 150(1)(a) should not be interpreted in a manner that
results in discrimination between caregivers who have a duty of
support towards their prospective foster children and those who
do not (ibid). Such an interpretation would not be in the children’s
best interests and would violate their right to equal protection
under the law (ibid). Accordingly, the question whether a care-
giver who owes a common-law duty of support to a child may be
appointed as the child’s foster parent and receive a foster care
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grant must be answered in the affirmative. However, the issue of
whether a caregiver owes a duty of support to the child is a factor
that weighs in the second stage of the inquiry as to whether the
child is in need of care and protection, when the question of
whether the child has an enforceable claim for support must be
answered in relation to the child’s visible means of support (para
[25]).
Undertaking the first stage of the enquiry into whether the
children in the present case were in need of care and protection
as envisaged by s 150(1)(a), Carelse J pointed out that the
children were orphaned and had been living with their grand-
mother for some time (para [29]). She then turned to the second
stage of the enquiry, that is, whether the children have any visible
means of support. She supported the decision in SS that the court
must focus on the child’s financial means, not the caregiver’s
income (paras [30], [31]). In doing so, the court must first
determine whether the children have the means to support
themselves — clearly not the position in the present case (para
[30]). It must then determine whether the children have an
enforceable claim for support. The question is not merely whether
somebody has a duty of support towards the children, but
whether the children are in a position to enforce their claim for
support against that person. Consequently, the financial position
of the person who has the duty to support the children must be
investigated. If the person is not in a financial position to support
the children, the caregiver should be able to apply for a foster
care grant (para [32]). On the facts of this case, it was clear that
the children’s grandmother was not in a financial position to
support them (ibid). Carelse J accordingly upheld the appeal,
found the children to be in need of care and protection and
placed them in their grandmother’s foster care. She also made an
order that the grandmother receive foster care grants for the
children. The order was antedated to the date on which the
children’s court had declared that the children were not in need
of care and protection (para [33]).
The court’s interpretation of ss 150(1)(a) and 156(1)(e) is
supported. It is, in any event, doubtful whether the court in SS
intended that its decision should be interpreted to exclude
caregivers who do owe a common-law duty of support to their
prospective foster children. It was probably simply because the
facts of that case concerned such caregivers that the dictum in
SS was framed in the particular way.
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Maintenance
The decision in MN v AJ 2013 (3) SA 26 (WCC) deals with an
enrichment claim by a former husband who discovered that he
was not the biological father of a child who was born during the
subsistence of the couple’s marriage. He attempted to hold his
former wife liable, using the condictio indebiti, for the mainte-
nance he had been paying to her for the child since their divorce.
When still unreported, the decision was discussed by Helen Scott
‘Unjustified enrichment’ 2011 Annual Survey 1257–60. Since then,
several other authors have added their voices to the debate on
the judgment. In general, they are critical of the judgment.
Helen Scott supports the court’s conclusion that the husband
did not make a mistake capable of founding restitution, but she
criticises its decision that the person who alleges enrichment
must prove such enrichment. She points out that although this
view has the (apparently beneficial) effect of disincentivising
enrichment claims in respect of maintenance already paid, it
‘would also give rise to routine paternity testing at the time of
divorce, whether or not the maintaining parent entertained doubts
about his child’s paternity’, which would tend to destroy any
loving and caring relationship the maintaining parent might have
had with the child. JC Sonnekus ‘Koekoekskuikens en onbe-
doelde saakwaarneming as grondslag vir ’n eis vir onverskul-
digde betaling — enkele kritiese regsvergelykende opmerkings
(1)’ (2013) 76 THRHR 623 makes a similar point and indicates
that the court failed to identify how the husband’s actions
deviated from those of the reasonable person. Rani Pillay and
Noel Zaal ‘Misattributed paternity: Should there be a right to
reimbursement of maintenance erroneously paid? [Discussion of
Nel v Jonker (A653/2009) 2011 ZAWCHC 5 (17 February 2011)]’
(2012) 23 Stell LR 583, consider the court’s finding that the
husband was indifferent as to whether he owed maintenance in
respect of the child ‘somewhat artificial’ (593). They conclude that
‘[a]pplication of the condictio indebiti and particularly the way
in which its requirements were implemented in Nel’s case [MN
v AJ] has set an unfortunate precedent’ (595). M Carnelley and
S Hoctor ‘Misattributed paternity — Nel v Jonker (WCHC) unre-
ported case number A653/2009 dated 2001–02–17’ (2012) 33
Obiter 163, are also critical of the judgment, but they are less
convinced that it sets a precedent. They seem to be hopeful that
the court may in a different case with different facts be disinclined
to interpret MN v AJ as authority for the view that maintenance
can never be recovered in the case of misattributed paternity
(177).
436 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW
The second case on child maintenance in the period under
review is SH v GF and Another 2013 (6) SA 621 (SCA). It is an
unsuccessful appeal against the decision by Kollapen AJ (as he
then was) in GF v SH and Others 2011 (3) SA 25 (GNP). This case
concerns contempt of court proceedings arising from a father’s
failure to pay maintenance for his children in terms of a divorce
settlement agreement, and the issue of whether a written agree-
ment can be varied orally even if it provides that its terms can only
be varied by way of a written document signed by both parties.
The parties had frequent disputes over their children’s mainte-
nance. At one stage, they reached a mediated agreement which
varied the maintenance arrangements they had agreed on in the
divorce settlement. The terms of the mediated agreement were
captured in a letter the mediator sent to the parties, but were not
set out in a written document signed by the parties. The mediated
agreement provided that the revised maintenance arrangement
would operate on a trial basis and would be reviewed on a
specified date. This agreement still did not bring an end to the
parties’ disputes. The children’s mother (appellant) caused a writ
of execution in the sum of R303 154,62 to be issued against their
father (first respondent) for arrear child maintenance. The father
thereupon brought an application to have the writ set aside on the
ground that he was not in breach of his maintenance obligations.
He contended that the writ should not have been issued,
because it was based on his maintenance obligations as deter-
mined in the divorce settlement agreement, while the parties had
agreed on maintenance obligations that differed from those the
settlement agreement had imposed on him. Relying on the clause
in the settlement agreement that required variation to be reduced
to writing and to be signed by both parties, the children’s mother
opposed the application. She further brought a counter-applica-
tion for an order declaring the father to be in contempt of court
and committing him to prison or imposing an appropriate sus-
pended sentence. The trial court set the writ of execution aside
but convicted the father of contempt of court as it was clear that
he had indeed failed to comply with his maintenance obligations
at certain times. Kollapen AJ imposed a suspended sentence on
the father conditional upon his paying arrear maintenance of
R73 140,85. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the
children’s mother contended that the sentence was inappropriate
because the trial court should have ordered the father to pay at
least the amount of the writ of execution, and that the sanction
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should have included a further condition that subjected the
suspension of the sentence to future compliance with the mainte-
nance order.
The Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out that the trial court
had exercised a discretion in the strict sense when imposing
sentence (para [9]). (On the difference between a discretion in
the strict and the broad sense, see, for example, Media Workers
Association of South Africa v Press Corporation of South Africa
Ltd 1992 (4) SA 791 (A); Knox D’Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 1996 (4) SA
348 (A).) A court of appeal may only interfere with the exercise of
a discretion in the strict sense if the trial court was influenced by a
wrong principle of law or misdirection of fact, or if it failed to
exercise a discretion at all. The Supreme Court of Appeal was
prepared to accept that if the amount of arrear maintenance
should have been substantially greater than the amount that had
been determined by the trial court, a material misdirection would
be established (para [10]). It found that this was indeed the case,
because the father’s maintenance obligations had to be deter-
mined in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement
(para [15]). It pointed out that both parties were aware of the
non-variation clause in the settlement agreement, and that they
had intended that the mediated agreement would operate only on
a trial basis. If the trial period proved successful, the settlement
agreement would be formally varied, but until that happened,
the maintenance order issued in accordance with the terms of the
settlement agreement would remain in place (ibid).
The Supreme Court of Appeal further held that ‘the view
of KollapenAJ that in the light of the oral agreement of variation of
the maintenance order it would offend against public policy to
enforce the non-variation clause, cannot be endorsed’ (para
[16]). It pointed out that it had ‘for decades confirmed that the
validity of a non-variation clause such as the one in question is
itself based on considerations of public policy and this is now
rooted in the Constitution’ (para [16], citing SA Sentrale Ko-op
Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren en Andere 1964 (4) SA 760 (A)
767A–C and Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) paras [7], [8],
[90], [91] as authority). It re-iterated the view in Media 24 Ltd
and Others v SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd (Avusa Media
Ltd and Others as Amici Curiae) 2011 (5) SA 329 (SCA) para-
graph [35], that policy decisions taken by the Supreme Court of
Appeal cannot be changed just because a particular court would
have decided the matter differently. Unless there are good
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reasons for change, the status quo should be confirmed (para
[16], referring to Media 24 Ltd para [35]). It found that the policy
considerations Kollapen AJ had relied upon were actually those
the court had weighed up in Shifren (above) (para [16]). Shifren
established the principle that a written agreement may not be
varied orally if it contains a clause stipulating that variation must
be in writing — a principle confirmed in Brisley v Drotsky (above).
The Supreme Court of Appeal further found that, on his own
version, the father had failed to meet his maintenance obligations
for a period of eleven months (para [17]). Regarding the remain-
der of the period of his alleged failure to comply with his
maintenance obligations, the papers revealed material disputes
of fact that could not be resolved on the papers (paras [18], [20]).
As it is trite that, regardless of where the onus lies, factual
disputes in motion proceedings must be determined on the
respondent’s version unless his or her version consists of ‘bald or
uncreditworthy denials, raises fictitious disputes of fact, is palpa-
bly implausible, far-fetched or so clearly untenable that the court
is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers’ (para [18]). The
Supreme Court of Appeal accepted that the father had indeed
met his maintenance obligations during the remainder of the
period (paras [18], [20]). Referring to s 28(2) of the Constitution,
which provides that the best interests of the child are of para-
mount importance in all matters concerning the child, the
Supreme Court of Appeal stated that it was unfortunate that it
could not determine which amount the father owed for the
remainder of the period. However, the children and their mother
are not without a remedy with regard to such amount, because
enforcement proceedings can be brought in terms of the Mainte-
nance Act 99 of 1998 on the ground of the court’s finding that
the maintenance order that had been made in accordance with
the terms of the settlement agreement had not been varied (para
[22]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected the mother’s contention
that the sanction imposed by the trial court was inappropriate. It
held that the sanction was in keeping with the way in which the
relief the mother had sought was framed, since the relief provided
for the imposition of a suspended sentence on such terms as the
court may deem fit (para [23]). Furthermore, the sanction
imposed by the trial court did not leave the mother and children
without a remedy, because the maintenance order could be
enforced in terms of the Maintenance Act (para [24]). The
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Supreme Court of Appeal, accordingly, dismissed the appeal
(para [27]).
In so far as child maintenance is concerned, see also the
discussion of SJ v CJ 2013 (4) SA 350 (GSJ) below.
Right to parental care
In M and Another v Minister of Police 2013 (5) SA 622 (GNP),
the mothers of two minor children claimed damages on behalf of
their children for loss of support resulting from the death of the
children’s father in police custody. They also claimed constitu-
tional damages on the ground that the death of the children’s
father deprived the children of their right to parental care, which
is enshrined in s 28(1)(b) of the Constitution. As the claim for loss
of support was settled, the judgment centres on whether constitu-
tional damages can be awarded for loss of the right to parental
care. The defendant contended that there is no scope for the
introduction of constitutional damages for loss of parental care in
a case such as the present, because the common-law action for
loss of support provides ample compensation to the children.
Referring to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Appeal
and the Constitutional Court, Mothle J stated that it is clear that
South African law recognises that constitutional damages may be
appropriate relief for loss suffered as a result of the unlawful
violation of a constitutional right, which includes the right to
parental care (paras [17], [18]). Quoting the definition of ‘care’ in
s 1 of the Children’s Act, he opined that this definition gives a
general indication of what ‘family or parental care’ involves. The
content of ‘care’ is amplified throughout the Act, and more
specifically in chapters 2, 3, 5 and 9–13 (paras [19], [20]; see
also para [43]). (These chapters deal with general principles
(including the best interests of the child); parental responsibilities
and rights; partial care; children in need of care and protection;
contribution orders; alternative care; foster care; and child and
youth care centres.) In view of the provisions of the Act, ‘care’ —
including the right to parental care — is more extensive than the
items covered by the common-law claim for loss of support,
which relates only to financial support (paras [20]–[22]). How-
ever, ‘for now, actions for damages arising out of s 28 of the
Constitution will not be based on the child’s deprivation of
parental love and affection’, because the definition of ‘care’ in the
Act does not refer to ‘a need ‘‘to show love and affection to the
child’’ ’ (para [23]).
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This does not mean that the right to family or parental care
does not qualify for protection and enforcement. However,
because a child’s right to family or parental care ‘is a constitu-
tional right which is also expressed in a statute, the Children’s
Act’, the future protection, enforcement and development of the
right to family or parental care will flow from the interpretation of
the Act (paras [26], [43]). Presumably, this statement by Mothle J
relates to what André van der Walt has termed ‘subsidiarity
principles’ in respect of constitutional rights (AJ van der Walt
‘Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term’
(2008) 1 CCR 77). These subsidiarity principles are derived from
decisions where the Constitutional Court has held that someone
who contends that a constitutional right has been infringed must
rely on legislation that has specifically been enacted to protect
the particular right, and that he or she may not rely on the
constitutional provision directly when seeking to protect the right
(see, for example, South African National Defence Union v
Minister of Defence and Others 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC); MEC for
Education, KwaZulu-Natal and Others v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474
(CC); Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129
(CC); Nokotyana and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipal-
ity and Others 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC)). Nor may he or she rely
on the common law directly if legislation has been specifically
enacted to protect the constitutional right (see, for example,
Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty)
Ltd and Others (Treatment Action Campaign and Another as
Amici Curiae) 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC); Walele v City of Cape Town
and Others above). Based on his views on the meaning and
content of ‘parental care’ and the subsidiarity principles, Mothle J
concluded that ‘[t]he development of the concept of loss of
support will . . . have to be effected also within the context of the
rights of the child as stated in s 28(1) of the Constitution and the
Children’s Act’ (para [44]).
He held that unlawful violation of the child’s right to family or
parental care should afford the child a right to claim damages
(para [52]). However, the child cannot claim for both loss of
support and deprivation of parental care, as this would amount to
duplication and unjustified enrichment because financial support
is part of parental care (para [51]). Oddly, Mothle J nevertheless
held that the plaintiffs had a right to claim constitutional damages
on behalf of their children for the unlawful deprivation of their
father’s care, even though the facts indicate that the parties had
441FAMILY LAW
already reached a settlement about the children’s claim for loss
of support (paras [54], [57], [58.1]). Perhaps the judge had in
mind that the settlement should be revisited in view of his
decision on constitutional damages for deprivation of parental
care, because he did not make the settlement part of the order of
court, as the parties had requested him to do. He ordered that the
minors must be compensated for proven constitutional damages
they suffered as a result of the unlawful deprivation of their right to
parental care. He referred proof of damages (quantum) to trial
(paras [56], [58.2], [58.4]).
In view of the far-reaching consequences of this judgment,
there is little doubt that the defendant will lodge an appeal. On M,
see further the chapter on Constitutional Law.
DIVORCE
Deed of settlement
In PL v YL 2012 (6) SA 29 (ECP) (‘PL v YL (1)’), Alkema J
granted an application for leave to appeal against an order in
which he had refused to make a portion of the settlement
agreement of the parties to an uncontested divorce action an
order of court in terms of s 7(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 (‘the
Act’) (see 2012 Annual Survey 341). PL v YL 2013 (6) SA 28
(ECG) (‘PL v YL’) is the appeal judgment of the Full Bench of the
Eastern Cape High Court, Grahamstown.
Alkema J had in the past already raised objections against
making a settlement agreement — which is, in essence, a
contract — an order of court. In Thutha v Thutha 2008 (3) SA 494
(TkH), he had stated that incorporating settlement agreements
into court orders frequently led to problems relating to enforce-
ment, and that only terms which are readily capable of execution
(such as unconditional maintenance payments and some
arrangements relating to care of the parties’ children) should be
embodied in court orders. He had held that the practice of
making settlement agreements orders of court should not be
followed. In PL v YL (1), he remained steadfast in this view. He
nevertheless granted the parties leave to appeal to the Full Bench
on whether Thutha had been correctly decided and, if so,
whether the guidelines he had offered in Thutha on when a
settlement agreement could be made an order of court should be
followed in the Eastern Cape Division (paras [10], [31], [52]). The
Supreme Court of Appeal subsequently extended the grounds of
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appeal to include, first, that Alkema J had erred in PL v YL (1) by
granting orders in terms of the husband’s particulars of claim
while the parties had arrived at a different agreement in their
divorce settlement and, second, that he had erred in not granting
an order in accordance with the terms of the parties’ settlement
agreement, at least in respect of their immovable property (para
[7]).
The parties were married in community of property. In their
settlement agreement they agreed that the terms of the agree-
ment would be incorporated into the order of court; the movable
property would be divided between them in a specified manner;
the wife would receive a sum of money and certain purchased
items in return for transferring her half share in the spouses’
immovable property to the husband; both parties would do what
was necessary to achieve the latter transfer; and the parties
would be co-holders of parental responsibilities and rights over
their children. The family advocate was satisfied that the arrange-
ments regarding the children would be in the children’s best
interests.
The Full Bench summarised the issue it had to decide as
follows
This appeal is in broad terms concerned with the question of when the
court will be entitled to make a settlement agreement between parties
in divorce proceedings an order of court, and when to comply with a
request by the parties to do so (para [3]).
Delivering the decision of the Full Bench, Van Zyl ADJP
emphasised that his judgment was limited to divorce settlement
agreements in which the parties agreed that the terms of their
agreement should be made an order of court (para [8]). He
stated that in all the divisions of the High Court, except KwaZulu-
Natal, the incorporation of settlement agreements into court
orders is a firmly established practice (para [18]; but see Thutha
v Thutha para [40] where it is indicated that the Free State
Division also does not incorporate settlement agreements in its
orders).
He pointed out that some aspects of divorce relate to status
and the welfare of the parties’ children, and that the parties
cannot dispose of these aspects without the intervention of the
court. This is so because ss 3 and 6(1) of the Act confer exclusive
powers on the court to decide whether there is a ground for
divorce and whether the provisions made or contemplated
regarding the welfare of any minor or dependent child of the
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marriage are satisfactory or the best that can be effected in
the circumstances (paras [11]–[13]). Consequently, any agree-
ment the parties might reach on these matters is subject to the
court’s approval (para [13]). Despite their agreement, evidence
must be placed before the court to enable it to decide whether a
ground for divorce is present and whether the arrangements that
have been made for the children are satisfactory or the best that
can be achieved in the circumstances (paras [11], [12]). If the
court sanctions the terms of the agreement in respect of these
matters and incorporates them into its order, it does so based on
the evidence placed before it (para [13]).
In contrast, s 7(1) of the Act specifically empowers the court to
make an order in accordance with the terms of the parties’
settlement agreement in so far as the division of their assets and
post-divorce spousal maintenance are concerned (ibid). Conse-
quently, the spouses’ agreement relating to these issues relieves
the court of the duty to decide them (para [13]). However, the
court is not compelled to incorporate the terms of the agreement
relating to these issues in its order. It has a discretion whether or
not to do so (paras [14], [24]). Any order the court makes in
respect of these issues is made to assist the parties in resolving
their disputes and to facilitate enforcement of the terms of their
agreement (para [14]). Such facilitation is achieved because, if
the court makes an order in accordance with the terms of the
parties’ settlement agreement, the parties may return directly to
that court for an order enforcing the order reflecting the terms of
their agreement (para [10]).
Van Zyl ADJP indicated that two requirements must be satisfied
before the court will consider a request to grant a judgment in
accordance with the terms of a settlement agreement (para [15]).
First, the court must be satisfied that the parties freely and
voluntarily concluded the agreement and that they are agreed on
its terms. In the case of a divorce settlement agreement, the court
must specifically be satisfied that the parties agreed that the
terms of the agreement must be made an order of court.
Secondly, the order sought must be ‘a competent and proper one
to make in the circumstances’ (ibid). This requirement implies that
the settlement agreement must relate to an issue between the
parties that is properly before the court, that the court would have
had jurisdiction had the parties not entered into a settlement
agreement, and that it is not objectionable. Therefore, the terms
of the agreement must not be illegal, contrary to public policy or
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good morals, or violate a constitutional right, and must ‘hold some
practical and legitimate advantage’ (ibid).
The court then turned to Alkema J’s judgment in Thutha. It
summarised the essence of the judgment as follows
The practice of the wholesale incorporation of the terms of a settle-
ment agreement into an order of court by simply recording that the
terms thereof are made an order of the court, must not be followed.
Unless the settlement agreement translates into a decree to do
something, or to refrain from doing something, it should not be made
an order of court. Instead, those terms in the agreement which deal
with matters in respect of which the court is required to make a finding
in terms of s 6 of the DivorceAct, must be translated by the court into a
format that makes it capable of ready enforcement, and must be
recorded in the order. All other matters with which the settlement
agreement deals with must be left as contractual terms and it is up to
the parties to choose to treat non-compliance therewith as a breach of
contract (para [21]).
Van Zyl ADJP held that the court in Thutha (and the decision in
Mansell v Mansell 1953 (3) SA 716 (N) on which Thutha was
based) essentially confined the ‘advantage of turning a settle-
ment agreement into an order of the court, to the ease with which
the proposed order is capable of enforcement’ (para [29]). He
stated that because other legitimate considerations may be
relevant to the court’s decision to exercise its power in terms of
the section, this limitation placed an undue restriction on the
power that s 7(1) confers on the court.
He pointed out that if the court refuses to make an order in
accordance with the spouses’ settlement agreement, such order
may not be made at a later stage or by a different court (ibid).
Consequently, for instance, the parties’ agreement in relation to
post-divorce spousal maintenance cannot subsequently be
varied in terms of s 8(1) of the Act as this section applies only to a
‘maintenance order’ (para [30]; see also Schutte v Schutte 1986
(1) SA 872 (A)). Further, because s 8(1) does not provide for
variation of an order relating to division of the parties’ assets, an
order in terms of s 7(1) is final as regards the division of the
parties’ assets. According to Van Zyl ADJP, these examples show
that making an order as envisaged in s 7(1) results in a change in
the status of the rights and duties of the parties in that the terms of
the agreement become part of a court order by virtue of the
judicial act of incorporating the agreement in the order. There-
fore, the settlement agreement is vested ‘with the authority, force
and effect of a judgment’ (para [32]). Because the court retains
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authority to ensure that its orders are complied with, either party
may approach the court for appropriate relief if one of them fails
to honour the terms of the consent order (ibid; see also para [10]).
Another benefit or practical advantage of making an order in
terms of s 7(1) is that ‘it enables the court to grant an order with
regard to matters it may otherwise not have been able to grant’,
such as occupation of immovable property by the spouse with
whom the children are to reside (para [33]). The order could also
protect the parties against the claims of third parties. In this
regard Van Zyl ADJP referred to Corporate Liquidators (Pty) Ltd
and Another v Wiggill and Others 2007 (2) SA 520 (T), where it
was held that the order results in the immediate vesting of
ownership of movable assets in the respective parties without the
need for delivery (ibid).
Further, the court must encourage amicable dispute resolution
in divorce proceedings since the adversarial system is not ideally
suited to dealing with the personal and individual nature of the
issues in a divorce action (para [34]). According to Van Zyl ADJP,
s 7(1) ‘is an attempt by the legislature to encourage parties to
resolve by agreement their financial and proprietary issues’,
because ‘beneficial consequences’ follow from the making of an
order in terms of the section. Amicable dispute resolution also
provides benefits for the orderly and effective administration of
justice, because it avoids costly and acrimonious trials and
reduces over-crowded court rolls. For the parties, it reduces
expense and the risks associated with litigation. It also ‘has the
potential to promote a more lasting relationship of cooperation
between litigants, particularly in divorce matters where interests
such as those of the children stand to benefit’, because ‘parties
are more likely to abide by what they both agreed to, than what
they may feel had been forced upon them by the court after a
costly and acrimonious trial’ (para [36]; see also para [37]). Since
the wider interests of administration of justice come into play, the
court must consider the broader impact of its order and not only
the need to make orders that are readily enforceable (para [38]).
Consequently, the findings in Thutha that the practice of incorpo-
rating the terms of a settlement agreement into an order of court
should not be followed, and that no agreement should be made
an order of court unless its provisions can be turned into an order
that is capable of execution ‘without redress to further litigation’
(Thutha para [55]), are ‘unduly inflexible and restrictive’ and
diminish the importance of the role the court may play in the
finalisation of divorce proceedings (para [38]).
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The Full Bench also rejected Thutha on the ground that
the decision was ‘premised on the incorrect assumption that the
court will only give effect to an order that is readily enforceable’
(para [39]). The court’s inherent power to enforce its orders
should not be limited in this way. It should exercise its power in
the light of the facts of each case and is not compelled to commit
a recalcitrant party for contempt of court. The court may grant
whatever relief it finds appropriate. As a result, it may, for
example, instruct a specified third party to make performance to
the judgment debtor; instruct the Registrar of Deeds to sign the
necessary documents to effect transfer of immovable property; or
instruct an officer of the court to seize movable property and
deliver it to the judgment debtor (ibid). It may also make an order
compelling the recalcitrant party to comply with the terms of the
consent judgment, and if he or she fails to do so, the other party
can institute contempt proceedings. Such an order may be
required if the obligation imposed on the recalcitrant party by the
settlement agreement was conditional upon some further event.
Therefore, there is
no reason why a right or an obligation in a consent judgment which is
otherwise capable, in the absence of the judgment, of supporting a
contractual claim for specific performance, should not also be
capable of being translated in subsequent proceedings into an
executory order (para [40]).
However, in each case the court must scrutinise the settlement
agreement in order to determine whether the terms of the
agreement are appropriate to being accorded the status of an
order of court. This determination should be made in view of the
merits of the case, taking all the relevant considerations into
account. These considerations include the benefits that granting
the order may hold for the parties and the general judicial policy
favouring the settlement of disputes (para [41]). The court should
further bear in mind that even though each term of the agreement
may ‘notionally constitute a separate agreement’, the agreement
may be a package deal, and its terms ‘may not be capable of
meaningful separation and without destroying the consensual
basis on which the agreement as a whole is founded’ (para [48]).
Furthermore, the validity of the entire agreement might depend
on its being made an order of court, as the defendant might have
withdrawn his or her opposition to the action on condition that the
agreement would become an order of court (ibid).
If the court declines to make the settlement agreement an order
of court, the parties should be informed of the reasons and
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should be given an opportunity to address the court’s concerns
(ibid). If the court’s concerns are not adequately addressed, the
court must ‘leave it to the parties to elect to either be content with
their agreement or parts thereof not being incorporated into the
court’s order, or to proceed to trial’ (para [49]). The court may not
make an order that amounts to a unilateral alteration of the terms
of the settlement agreement (ibid).
The court further pointed out that its mandate to exercise its
discretion in terms of s 7(1) is derived from the spouses’ settle-
ment agreement, and that the consent order itself is based on the
terms of that agreement (paras [46], [48]). Referring to Swadif
(Pty) Ltd v Dyke NO 1978 (1) SA 928 (A), the court pointed out
that the consent order does not have the effect of eliminating the
contractual basis of the spouses’ agreement, but that the provi-
sions of the agreement are thereafter to be enforced by way of
the remedies available to a judgment creditor on a judgment
(para [46]).
For the above reasons, the Full Bench concluded that Thutha
had not been correctly decided. It also found that the appeal
should be allowed on the ground that Alkema J had erred in
granting orders in terms of the husband’s particulars of claim and
in not incorporating the parties’ settlement agreement in the order
of court (paras [50], [52], [53]). It held that there was no evidence
to support Alkema J’s conclusion that the relief the husband had
claimed best served the children’s welfare (para [50]). Further,
Alkema J had erred in making an order for forfeiture of benefits as
the husband had effectively abandoned this claim by asking the
court to make an order in terms of the parties’ settlement
agreement, which did not provide for forfeiture (para [51]).
Relying on Geard v Geard 1943 EDL 322, 327 and Harris v Harris
1949 (1) SA 254 (A), Van Zyl ADJP held that an order for forfeiture
‘will not be made unless it is claimed by the plaintiff’ (ibid). If
the court were to order forfeiture even though the plaintiff had
abandoned his or her claim for forfeiture, it ‘would mean that relief
was granted which was not sought, and that the court was
making a contract for the parties’ (ibid). Furthermore, no evidence
had been placed before the trial court to determine whether the
wife would benefit if a forfeiture order were not issued, and if so,
whether such benefit would be undue (ibid).
The detailed judgment by the Full Bench is most welcome and
brings judicial practice in the Eastern Cape in line with practice in
the majority of the divisions of the High Court. Further, the court’s
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statement that an order for forfeiture ‘will not be made unless it is
claimed by the plaintiff’ (para [51]) lends judicial support to the
view of several authors that, even though s 9 of the Act does not
indicate whether the court may make a forfeiture order of its own
accord, the section should be interpreted as not conferring this
power on the court (see Graham Glover ‘Divorce’ in Brigitte Clark
(ed) Family Law Service (1988) para D9; Lee & Honoré Family,
Things and Succession (HJ Erasmus, CG van der Merwe & AH
van Wyk) 2 ed (1983) para 131n(n); HR Hahlo The South African
Law of Husband and Wife 5 ed (1985) 373; Jacqueline Heaton
South African Family Law 3 ed (2010) 130 n56; Chuma Himonga
‘Marriage’ in Francois du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South
African Law 9 ed (2007) 339 n1011; Joan Church & Jacqueline
Church ‘Marriage’ in WA Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa vol
16 2 ed (2006) para 90).
Finally, it should be noted that the view of the Full Bench that a
consent order in a divorce action does not have the effect of
eliminating the contractual basis of the spouses’ agreement, but
that the provisions of the agreement are subsequently to be
enforced by way of the remedies available to a judgment creditor
(para [46]) is in keeping with Welgemoed v Mennell 2007 (4) SA
446 (SE). In Welgemoed (450G–H), the court held that, in the
case of spouses who have entered into a settlement agreement
that has been made an order of court in terms of s 7(1), the right
to post-divorce spousal maintenance results from the settlement
agreement — in other words, it is a contractual right that has
acquired the force of an order of court. With regard to the
contractual basis of a settlement agreement that has been made
an order of court, Van Zyl ADJP in PL v YL referred only to Swadif.
In Swadif, the then Appellate Division dealt with a judgment that
had been obtained on a bond in a case that was unrelated to
divorce. The Appellate Division held that the judgment did not
novate the contractual obligation under the bond, but rather
strengthened or reinforced it. The Appellate Division further held
that, although the right of action ‘is replaced by the right to
execute . . ., the enforceable right remains the same’ (Swadif
944G–H, approving the view in Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Dhooma
1970 (3) SA 304 (N)). It is a pity that Van Zyl ADJP did not also
refer to Welgemoed in this context, since this case relates
specifically to the contractual basis of an incorporated divorce
settlement agreement.
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Division of accrual on divorce
In MB v DB 2013 (6) SA 86 (KZD) (also reported as MGB v DEB
[2013] 4 All SA 99 (KZD)), the plaintiff sought an order of divorce
and an order directing her husband to pay her an amount equal
to one half of the difference between the accrual in their respec-
tive estates. It was clear that there was no accrual in her estate.
Consequently, she was essentially seeking an order for payment
of half of the accrual in her husband’s estate. There was a great
deal of uncertainty as to the value of the husband’s estate, the
assets that were excluded from the accrual in his estate and
the value of the excluded assets. The husband was everything
but forthcoming about these matters. A chartered accountant,
who testified for the wife, put the net value of the husband’s estate
at around R26 million. He was unable to trace the proceeds of all
the assets that were excluded from the accrual in the husband’s
estate.
In a most welcome dictum, Lopes J held that although the
plaintiff bears the onus of establishing the value of the share of
the accrual to which she is entitled, the defendant bears the onus
of indicating which assets are to be excluded from the accrual in
his estate and why they are to be excluded, because he is in
possession of all the facts relating to those assets (paras [22],
[28]). In this regard Lopes J relied on AM v JM 2011 JDR 0091
(WCC) para [43], where Cloete AJ held that the defendant bears
the onus of establishing that specific assets should be excluded
from the accrual (ibid). Lopes J stated that he was unable to
determine what had happened to the husband’s excluded assets
and whether or not they formed part of his current assets,
because the husband had led no evidence to show how the
excluded assets had been dealt with (para [23]).
Lopes J rejected the contention on behalf of the husband that
there was no acceptable evidence before the court as to the
value of his estate and that the evidence of the chartered
accountant who appeared for his wife was irrelevant. Lopes J
pointed out that the statements the chartered accountant had
relied on were based on documentation that formed part of the
husband’s discovered documents (paras [28], [36]). He further
held that even if some of the statements constituted hearsay
evidence, they could be admitted in terms of s 3(1) of the Law of
Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, inter alia because the
proceedings did not relate to a contractual issue between parties
who are at arm’s length, but concerned spouses who had been
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married for approximately fourteen years, had three children and
had built a life together in which they had pooled their resources,
abilities and efforts. Secondly, the evidence sought to be
adduced by the wife related to the accumulated wealth of the
spouses, and of the husband, in particular. The information
relating to the husband’s wealth was not readily available to the
wife and was contained in documents which were compiled on
the husband’s behalf and were presumably authorised and
signed by him. Consequently, it could be assumed that the
documents accurately reflect his assets and liabilities. Thirdly,
the parties agreed to the accrual system when they married,
and the evidence by the chartered accountant was tendered in
order to substantiate the wife’s claim to her share of the accrual.
Further, the evidence was of such a nature that it should not easily
be dismissed unless contradicted by the husband — which
the husband did not do. Finally, using the information in the
husband’s discovered tax returns to calculate the accrual in his
estate did not prejudice him, because he could have led evi-
dence to contradict the accuracy of the figures but had failed to
do so (para [38]).
In a further most welcome dictum, Lopes J held
[L]itigation is not a game where parties are able to play their cards
close to their chest in order to obtain a technical advantage to the
prejudice of the other party. This is even more so in matrimonial
matters where the lives of the parties have been inextricably bound
together and, as in this case, the efforts of both parties made a
significant contribution to the defendant’s estate (para [39]).
He cited English case law on disclosure of financial information
in divorce cases to support his view that a defendant cannot
complain if the court does not draw inferences in his or her favour
if he or she can easily explain his or her financial affairs but fails to
do so, or fails to provide full, frank and clear information to the
court (para [40]). In this regard NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclo-
sure) [2011] EWHC 3270 (Fam) is particularly instructive. In this
case, it was held that if one party’s disclosure has been materially
deficient
(i) The Court is duty bound to consider by the process of drawing
adverse inferences whether funds have been hidden;
(ii) But such inferences must be properly drawn and reasonable. It
would be wrong to draw inferences that a party has assets
which, on an assessment of the evidence, the Court is satisfied
he has not got;
(iii) If the Court concludes that funds have been hidden then it
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should attempt a realistic and reasonable quantification of those
funds, even in the broadest terms;
(iv) In making its judgment as to quantification the Court will first look
to direct evidence such as documentation and observations
made by the other party;
(v) The Court will then look to the scale of business activities and at
lifestyle;
(vi) Vague evidence of reputation or the opinions or beliefs of third
parties is inadmissible in the exercise; . . .
(viii) The Court must be astute to ensure that a non-discloser should
not be able to procure a result from his non-disclosure better
than that which would be ordered if the truth were told. If the
result is an order that is unfair to the non-discloser it is better
than that the Court should be drawn into making an order that is
unfair to the Claimant (NG v SG para [16]).
(Because the rendition of the quotation in MGB v DEB para [40]
is incorrect in some respects, the quotation in the text above has
been copied from the original version of NG v SG.)
Lopes J held that the approach adopted in the English cases
accords with the way evidence should be approached in divorce
proceedings in South Africa (para [40]). He accordingly
accepted that the figures provided in the husband’s discovered
documents could be used to demonstrate the value of the
husband’s estate (para [42]).
With regard to the date on which the value of the spouses’
estates should be determined, Lopes J preferred the judgment
of BrasseyAJ in MB v NB 2010 (3) SA220 (GSJ) to the decision of
Olivier J in Le Roux v Le Roux [2010] JOL 26003 (NCK) (paras
[31], [32]). In MB v NB, it was held that the issue as to the date is
one of procedure that arises because litigation takes time to
complete, and that litis contestatio is the pertinent date because
that is the moment ‘when the dispute crystallises and can be
presented to the court for decision’ (233C). In Le Roux, in
contrast, the court emphasised the wording of s 3(1) of the
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, which reads as follows
At the dissolution of a marriage subject to the accrual system, by
divorce or by the death of one or both of the spouses, the spouse
whose estate shows no accrual or a smaller accrual than the estate of
the other spouse, or his estate if he is deceased, acquires a claim
against the other spouse or his estate for an amount equal to half of
the difference between the accrual of the respective estates of the
spouses.
In Le Roux, it was held that a proper interpretation of s 3
dictates that the plaintiff may not proceed with a claim for
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accounting of the value of the defendant’s estate and payment of
half the difference between the accrual in the respective estates,
before the marriage has been dissolved, because the plaintiff
does not have an acquired and complete cause of action to claim
payment until the divorce order has been granted. As is eminently
sensible, Lopes J held that ‘it is wholly impractical that parties to a
divorce should go to the lengths of establishing a right to accrual
in the divorce action and then have to embark upon a further
litigious exercise in order to decide the extent of such accrual’
(para [31]). He doubted whether the legislature could have
intended ‘to devise a procedure which seems only calculated to
prolong the settlement of disputes between parties to a marriage,
and to greatly increase the legal costs of being able to resolve
their differences’ (ibid). Like the decision of Brassey AJ in MB v
NB, which was praised in 2010 Annual Survey 468, Lopes J’s
dictum is most welcome.
In view of the above findings and on the basis of the discovered
documents, Lopes J arrived at an accrual of R14 649 969,26 in the
husband’s estate (paras [44], [45], [50]–[52]). This amount
excluded the value of a loan account in the amount of
R11 001 528, which was allegedly irrecoverable due to the finan-
cial difficulties of the business in which the account was held
(paras [45]–[49], [52]). Because the husband had failed to lead
evidence about the financial position of the business and did not
discover its books or financial statements, Lopes J found that it
was more probable than not that the loan account was an asset in
the husband’s estate (paras [46]–[48]). However, because of the
possibility that the loan account was indeed irrecoverable, he held
that the most equitable manner to deal with the loan account was
to exclude it from the accrual calculation and to declare that the
wife had a right to recover half of the loan account. Therefore, if the
loan account were indeed irrecoverable, she would get no share
of the loan account, and if it were recoverable, she would get
half of the recoverable amount (para [49]). In addition, the hus-
band was ordered to pay the plaintiff half of the accrual in the value
of his estate, excluding the loan account, within three-and-a-half
months (paras [53], [56]). Pending such payment, he had to pay
his wife maintenance in terms of an agreement the spouses had
reached in rule 43 proceedings (paras [54], [56]).
This judgment is a welcome blow to spouses who seek to limit
the scope of their wealth, hide assets and/or raise technical
points in order to prejudice their soon-to-be former spouses.
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However, the way in which the court framed its order in respect of
the husband’s loan account is of some concern. The court
declared the wife ‘to be the owner of one half of the defendant’s
loan account in Full House Taverns (Pty) Ltd’ (para [56](b)). This
part of the order is problematic because the accrual system does
not give the spouses rights in respect of each other’s property
(Heaton South African Family Law 94). Section 4(1)(a) of the
Matrimonial Property Act refers to the accrual as ‘the amount by
which the net value’ of a spouse’s estate at the dissolution of the
marriage exceeds the ‘net value’ at the commencement of the
marriage, and s 3(1) refers to the accrual claim as ‘an amount
equal to half of the difference between the accrual of the
respective estates of the spouses’ (emphasis added). These
sections make it clear that the accrual and accrual claim relate to
amounts linked to the value of an estate; they do not relate to
assets in the estate. Reeder v Softline Ltd and Another 2001 (2)
SA 844 (W) — a decision to which Lopes J referred in the context
of the date on which the value of the accrual is to be calculated
(para [32]) — is also relevant in this regard. In this case, the
applicant inter alia sought an order directing that certain shares
to which her husband was entitled had to be handed to her
attorney to be kept in trust pending the outcome of their divorce
proceedings, as she feared that her husband might dispose of
the shares and squander the proceeds. The court held, quite
correctly, that in terms of the accrual system neither spouse has a
right to specific assets in the other spouse’s estate. This certainly
is the rule while the marriage lasts. Upon divorce, s 10 of the
Matrimonial Property Act comes into play. It empowers a court to
defer satisfaction of an accrual claim ‘on such conditions, includ-
ing conditions relating to the furnishing of security, the payment of
interest, the payment of instalments, and the delivery or transfer
of specified assets, as the court may deem just’ (emphasis
added). Consequently, in the case of deferral, the court may
order transfer of specific assets, such as ‘one half of the
defendant’s loan account in Full House Taverns (Pty) Ltd’. How-
ever, in terms of s 10, such order is to be made ‘on the application
of a person against whom an accrual claim lies’. The judgment in
the present case does not indicate that such an application was
made by the husband. Therefore, it seems that the part of the
court’s order relating to the loan account was improperly made.
Pension interests on divorce
Section 7(7) and (8) of the Divorce Act, read with s 37D(4) of
the Pension Funds Act and the definition of ‘pension interest’ in
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s 1 of the Divorce Act, deems a spouse’s pension interest to be
part of his or her assets on divorce, and permits the payment of
the non-member spouse’s share of the member’s pension inter-
est to the non-member spouse on divorce, if the member belongs
to a pension fund as defined in s 1(1) of the Pension Funds Act.
The Government Employees Pension Law, 1996, as amended by
the Government Employees Pension Law Amendment Act 19 of
2011, affords the same benefit to non-member spouses of
members of the Government Employees Pension Fund. Until
7 November 2013, this benefit was not available to members of
the Post Office Retirement Fund and their spouses. On 7 March
2013, in Ngewu v Post Office Retirement Fund 2013 (4) BCLR 421
(CC), the Constitutional Court declared the provisions of the Post
Office Act (now the Post and Telecommunication-related Matters
Act) relating to pension sharing invalid to the extent that they
failed to provide for the clean-break principle by not enabling a
non-member spouse to claim payment of his or her share of the
member spouse’s pension interest on divorce (para [17] and
point 3 of the order in para [21]). The declaration of invalidity was
suspended for eight months to enable the legislature to cure the
constitutional defect (para [18] and point 4 of the order in para
[21]). The court further held that if the unconstitutionality were not
remedied by 7 November 2013, s 24A of the Government
Employees Pension Law would be read into the Post OfficeAct as
s 10F of the Post Office Act and would take effect on that date.
Parliament failed to meet the eight-month deadline. On
4 November 2013, the Minister of Communications brought an
urgent application requesting the Constitutional Court to extend
the deadline by six months. Among the reasons was that the
South African Post Office SOC Ltd Amendment Bill had already
been tabled in Parliament. Some of the provisions of the Bill
sought to address the unconstitutionality of the position relating to
pension sharing by members of the Post Office Retirement Fund.
The Constitutional Court dismissed the application with costs. It
provided the reasons for its decision in Minister of Communica-
tions v Ngewu and Others (CCT 117/11) [2013] ZACC 44
(5 December 2013) (subsequently reported at 2014 (3) BCLR
364 (CC)).
The Constitutional Court held that Ms Ngewu was suffering real
prejudice as a result of her inability to claim her share of her
former husband’s pension interest, since she had no means of
subsistence and had to move from place to place and live on
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handouts (para [12]). In contrast, the state would not suffer any
real prejudice if the extension of the deadline were not granted,
because the only difference between the reading-in order of the
court and the provisions of the Bill was that the period for
payment of the non-member spouse’s share of the member’s
pension interest provided for in the Bill was shorter than the
period stipulated in the reading-in order. The court dismissed
the state’s objection that denial of the extension would result
in the parliamentary legislative process having to be started
afresh (para [13]). It also dismissed the Minister’s argument that a
denial of the extension would result in court intervention in an
area of exclusive legislative power. It held that the constitutional
jurisprudence permits reading-in orders, and pointed out that
the Minister’s predecessor had consented to the reading-in order
when it was made (para [14]). Consequently, the reading-in
order came into effect on 7 November 2013, thereby placing
non-member spouses of members of the Post Office Retirement
Fund in the same position as non-member spouses of members
of a pension fund as defined in s 1(1) of the Pension Funds Act
and members of the Government Employees Pension Fund. A
little over two months later, the South African Post Office SOC Ltd
Amendment Act came into operation (see above).
Fritz v Fundsatwork Umbrella Pension Fund and Others 2013
(4) SA 492 (ECP) was discussed in 2012 Annual Survey 350 while
the case was still unreported.
Post-divorce child maintenance
SJ v CJ (above) concerns maintenance for an adult, depen-
dent child on her parents’ divorce and whether a legal represen-
tative should be appointed for the child. The child was 35 years
old and dependent on her parents because she was mentally
and physically handicapped. The child’s mother claimed redistri-
bution of assets, maintenance for herself and maintenance for the
child. The mother contended that a legal representative should
be appointed for the child as a conflict might arise between her
financial interests and those of the child. The court rejected this
contention on the ground that neither parent disputed that the
child needed maintenance; they only disagreed on the amount
each of them should contribute to the child’s maintenance after
their divorce. The child did not have to institute any claim for
maintenance against her parents as they agreed that they would
maintain her (paras [4]–[6]). In determining the amount that had
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to be paid as maintenance for the child after the divorce, the
court would have regard to the child’s needs and the ability of
each parent to meet those needs. In the process, the court would
investigate the existing and prospective assets, liabilities, income
and expenses of each parent, taking into account the orders it
intended making with regard to spousal maintenance and redis-
tribution of assets (paras [11]–[14]). As the child’s maintenance
needs would be met after the divorce, it was irrelevant to her
which assets might be redistributed and what their value was
(para [15]). Consequently, there was no conflict of interest
between the adult child and her mother, and a legal representa-
tive did not need to be appointed for her (paras [16], [17]).
Furthermore, if a legal representative were to be appointed for the
adult child, he or she would have no function of any value and
would make no relevant contribution, because the information
about the parents’ assets, liabilities, expenses and income would
be provided by the parties themselves in the divorce proceed-
ings (paras [18], [19]). The court, quite correctly, dismissed the
application (paras [20], [21]).
Separation of issues
In CC v MVC [2013] 4 All SA 327 (GSJ), the court held that
deciding the issue of whether a marriage has broken down
irretrievably can be separated from deciding issues relating to
the financial consequences of divorce, where the value of the
estate of one of the spouses depends on the determination of
protracted commercial proceedings relating to control and own-
ership of assets and the revocation of donations the spouse had
made. The judgment mostly concerns procedural issues. For
purposes of family law, it should be noted that Mokgoathleng J
held that a claim for redistribution of assets in terms of s 7(3) to
(6) of the Divorce Act (‘the Act’) arises only on the dissolution of
the marriage, and that discovery in order to establish the value
of the other spouse’s estate for purposes of redistribution can be
pursued after the granting of the divorce (paras [49], [50]).
The judge indicated that the issues relating to the grounds for a
decree of divorce are not inextricably linked to those relating to
post-divorce maintenance and redistribution of assets, even
though gross misconduct is a relevant factor in determining a
redistribution claim (para [38]). He failed to mention that miscon-
duct may also be taken into account in respect of maintenance.
His explicit reference to fault in the context of redistribution of
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assets but not post-divorce maintenance is surprising, because
s 7(2) of the Act expressly refers to fault as a relevant factor in the
context of post-divorce maintenance, while s 7(3) to (6) makes no
express reference to fault in the context of redistribution. Mok-
goathleng J is correct, however, in stating that fault plays a role in
respect of redistribution as our courts have held that fault can be
considered in respect of redistribution under the wide terms of
s 7(5)(d) of the Act, which provides that, in addition to certain
specified factors, the court must consider ‘any other factor which
should in the opinion of the court be taken into account’ (see, for
example, Swart v Swart 1980 (4) SA 364 (O); Beaumont v
Beaumont 1987 (1) SA 967 (A); Kritzinger v Kritzinger 1989 (1) SA
67 (A); Kretschmer v Kretschmer 1989 (1) SA 566 (W); Archer v
Archer 1989 (2) SA 885 (E); Buttner v Buttner 2006 (3) SA 23
(SCA)).
On the issue of whether the marriage had broken down, the
judge held that the fact that the parties had been living apart for
ten years, and that a child had been born from the relationship
between the husband and the woman he now wished to marry,
constituted prima facie proof of irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage (para [31]). The wife’s opposition to the separation of
issues was based, among others, on her fear that her husband
would use the separation of issues to decrease his assets and to
delay finalisation of her claim for redistribution (paras [16], [17]).
One suspects that this fear was not totally unfounded as her
husband, by his own admission, had transferred a large chunk of
his assets to his sons before instituting the divorce action and
was now seeking to undo the transfer, apparently because his
sons were seeking to oust him and his future wife from the family
business (paras [5]–[8]; the husband contended that the trans-
fers and donations had been made by agreement between him
and his current wife para [5]). Mokgoathleng J nevertheless
implied that the wife had impure motives. He stated that
[i]t is inappropriate for a party to an apparently irretrievably broken
down marriage to oppose the separation of issues in a divorce action
for the sole purpose of gaining a tactical advantage in order to secure
a more favourable s 7(3) patrimonial redistribution award or to use the
perpetuation of what seemingly appears to be an irretrievably broken
down marriage as a leverage for tactical reasons to pre-empt the
dissolution of such marriage for ulterior motives (para [41]).
Referring to Levy v Levy 1991 (3) SA 614 (A), he held that
public policy requires that parties should not be shackled to a
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moribund marriage (para [42]). He also pointed out that the
husband wished to marry his lover and turn their child into a child
born of married parents. He further referred to the child’s right to
family or parental care, which is enshrined in s 28(1)(b) of the
Constitution, and stated that this right must be taken into account
in considering whether to order separation of issues (paras [42],
[43]). (The judge referred to the right to ‘family life and parental
care’ but it is clear that he had the right to family care or parental
care in mind.) These statements create the impression that the
judge is of the view that a child’s right to family or parental care is
compromised simply by the fact of the child being born of
unmarried parents, even though the Children’s Act has radically
improved the legal position of many unmarried fathers and their
children. This impression is strengthened by the judge’s refer-
ences to ‘legitimation’ of the child by the marriage of the child’s
parents (paras [42], [43]), which harks back to the pejorative term
‘illegitimate child’ and the time when a child born of unmarried
parents suffered a number of legal disadvantages simply
because of the unmarried status of his or her parents.
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE BY DEATH
It is surprising that YG v Executor, Estate Late CGM 2013 (4)
SA 387 (WCC) came before the court, because the answer to the
legal question that had to be decided is obvious. The matter
came before GangenAJ as a stated case. The issue was whether
a claim for redistribution of assets in terms of s 7(3) of the Divorce
Act can be pursued against the executor of the estate of the
spouse against whom the claim was originally brought.
The deceased and his wife (plaintiff) were involved in divorce
proceedings when he died. The plaintiff contended that her claim
for redistribution of assets was not extinguished by her husband’s
death, because litis contestatio had been reached before his
death. In support of her contention, she relied on Uniform Rule 15
which provides that ‘[n]o proceedings shall terminate solely by
reason of the death, marriage or other change of status of any
party unless the cause of such proceedings is thereby extin-
guished’. She argued that, because the marriage was automati-
cally dissolved by her husband’s death, a divorce need not be
granted but her claim for redistribution still had to be determined.
Gangen AJ held, quite correctly, that a claim for divorce and
claims that are ancillary to the divorce, such as claims for
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post-divorce maintenance and redistribution of assets, are not
independent of one another (paras [8]–[15]). Furthermore, in Ex
parte Meyer NO: In re Meyer v Meyer 1962 (2) SA 688 (D) it was
held that the executor of a deceased plaintiff could not be
substituted as the plaintiff in a divorce action with a view to
obtaining an order of forfeiture of benefits on behalf of the
deceased estate, because a claim for forfeiture is ancillary to a
divorce order; as a divorce could no longer be granted because
the marriage had already been dissolved by death, the ancillary
relief could also not be granted (YG para [16], quoting Ex parte
Meyer NO 689F, 691B–C). Gangen AJ held that
[i]n order for parties to apply for a divorce and ancillary relief in terms
of the DivorceAct, there must be a marriage. In this case, the marriage
was dissolved by reason of the death of the defendant, and therefore
the cause of the proceedings is extinguished (para [19]).
Consequently, the widow’s reliance on Uniform Rule 15 had to
be rejected.
Gangen AJ further pointed out that the transmissibility of rights
and actions depends on whether the right or action in question is
in rem (real) or in personam (personal) (paras [21], [22]). A
divorce is a personal action which comes to an end automatically
if one of the spouses dies before the divorce order is granted.
Claims that are ancillary to divorce are also personal (paras [21],
[25]). Consequently, a claim that is ancillary to divorce cannot be
pursued once the marriage has been dissolved by death, regard-
less of whether litis contestatio has occurred (para [26]). Gangen
AJ accordingly held that the widow’s claim for redistribution was
extinguished by her husband’s death and that she did not have a
claim for redistribution against the executor of his estate (para
[27]).
This decision is clearly correct. A marriage is dissolved either
by death or by divorce. The provisions of the DivorceAct become
wholly inapplicable when a marriage is dissolved by the death of
either spouse, because these provisions relate only to divorce
and the consequences of divorce. It is remarkable that this
obvious fact was not grasped by the client and her legal
representatives. Perhaps they did grasp it, but nevertheless
proceeded with the litigation in the hope that they might ‘get
lucky’ and obtain for the widow a share of her former husband’s
estate which he had denied her by disinheriting her. One can but
speculate, but the latter impression is strengthened by the fact
that the widow instituted a separate claim against the deceased
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estate for maintenance in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving
Spouses Act 27 of 1990.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The unreported decision in Daffy v Daffy was discussed at
2012 Annual Survey 359. The decision has since been reported
at 2013 (1) SACR 42 (SCA).
LIFE PARTNERSHIPS
In Butters v Mncora 2012 (4) SA 1 (SCA), the Supreme Court of
Appeal dismissed an appeal against an order in which the
Eastern Cape High Court had awarded 30 per cent of the value of
the assets of a universal partnership to the female life partner
(see 2012 Annual Survey 360). The universal partnership had
existed since 1988, but the order of the High Court erroneously
referred to 1998. In Mncora v Butters; Butters v Mncora [2013] 3
All SA 330 (ECP), the High Court ordered substitution of the date.
MAINTENANCE
Post-divorce child maintenance
On post-divorce child maintenance, see the discussion of SJ v
CJ above.
MARRIAGE
Customary marriage
MM v MN and Another 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC) (also reported as
Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Another (Women’s Legal Centre
Trust and Others as Amici Curiae) 2013 (8) BCLR 918 (CC)) (‘MM
v MN (CC)’), is an appeal against the decision of the Supreme
Court of Appeal in MN v MM 2012 (4) SA 527 (SCA) (‘MN v MM ’)
(see 2012 Annual Survey 368). Briefly, the facts are as follows: the
applicant (M) and her husband married each other in terms of
Xitsonga customary law in 1984. Unbeknown to M, her husband
also married N under customary law in 2008. He did not obtain a
court-approved contract in terms of s 7(6) of the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (‘the Act’) before marrying
N. After her husband’s death, M attempted to have her customary
marriage registered in terms of the Act. The Director-General of
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Home Affairs refused to register the marriage on the ground that
N was already registered as the deceased’s wife. M successfully
approached the High Court for an order declaring the
deceased’s marriage to N void, and ordering the Department of
Home Affairs to register M’s marriage as the only customary
marriage her husband had entered into (MM v MN 2010 (4) SA
286 (GNP)). N successfully appealed to the Supreme Court of
Appeal. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the Act was
intended to advance the rights of women in customary marriages
by affording them rights to matrimonial property that they did not
previously have. Consequently, it was ‘difficult to reason that
s 7(6) could be intended solely for the protection of the wife in an
existing marriage’ (MN v MM para [19]). It further held that the
legislature did not intend non-compliance with s 7(6) to result in
any sanction because the purpose of the section was simply to
govern the spouses’ matrimonial property rights (MN v MM paras
[12], [13]; see also para [37]). Therefore, a further customary
marriage a husband concludes after the coming into operation of
the Act is valid regardless of whether or not s 7(6) has been
complied with (MN v MM paras [23], [24]; see also para [38]). The
application to have N’s customary marriage declared void was
dismissed, and the Minister of Home Affairs was ordered to
register M’s marriage to the deceased alongside N’s (MN v MM
para [28]).
On appeal, the majority of the Constitutional Court approached
the matter somewhat differently. It focused on the issue of
whether Xitsonga customary law requires the consent of the first
wife for the validity of the husband’s subsequent customary
marriages. Froneman, Khampepe and Skweyiya JJ, with whom
Moseneke DCJ and Cameron and Yacoob JJ concurred,
explained that, although M alleged in her founding papers in the
High Court that Xitsonga customary law required her consent to
her husband’s subsequent customary marriage and that she had
not consented to his marriage to N, neither the High Court nor the
Supreme Court of Appeal had considered it necessary to deal
with these allegations, because they had decided the matter by
interpreting and applying s 7(6) of the Act (MM v MN (CC) paras
[5]–[7], [52]).
Froneman, Khampepe and Skweyiya JJ pointed out that s 3(1)
of the Act lays down requirements for the validity of a customary
marriage that is concluded after the coming into operation of the
Act. These requirements are that: (a) the spouses must be majors
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and consent to be married to each other under customary law;
and (b) ‘the marriage must be negotiated and entered into or
celebrated in accordance with customary law’ (MM v MN (CC)
paras [28], [29]). Section 3(1)(b) implies that customary law may
impose validity requirements that are not expressly prescribed by
the Act (MM v MN (CC) paras [29], [32]). The first wife’s consent
to her husband’s subsequent customary marriage may be
required as a result of: (a) a provision in the Act; (b) a rule of
customary law; or (c) the Constitution (MM v MN (CC) para [33]).
The majority dealt with each of these possible sources to
determine whether it provides for the specific requirement.
First, from an investigation of the provisions and scheme of the
Act, the majority concluded that the Act does not directly require
the first wife’s consent (MM v MN (CC) paras [34]–[41]). In
respect of s 7(6), it specifically endorsed the view of the Supreme
Court of Appeal that the section does not deal with the require-
ments for the validity of a customary marriage but simply involves
the matrimonial property system (MM v MN (CC) para [41]).
Secondly, the majority considered whether Xitsonga customary
law requires the first wife’s consent. It examined the evidence
provided by experts, individuals in polygynous marriages under
Xitsonga customary law, various traditional leaders and an advi-
sor to traditional leaders (MM v MN (CC) paras [54]–[59]). It
concluded that when a VaTsonga man decides to enter into a
further customary marriage, he must inform his first wife. The first
wife is expected to agree to the further marriage. If she withholds
consent, attempts are made to persuade her. The parties’ families
may be called in to assist in resolving the issue, which could include
the spouses getting divorced. If the first wife is not informed of
the planned marriage, the second union is not recognised, but the
children born of the marriage are regarded as having been born of
married parents (MM v MN (CC) para [61]).
Thirdly, the majority considered the Constitution, and particu-
larly the rights to equality and dignity (ss 9 and 10 of the
Constitution). It pointed out that the Constitutional Court has
repeatedly emphasised the importance of the rights to equality
and dignity, and that the right to dignity (together with the right to
life) is ‘the ‘‘most important of all human rights, and the source of
all other personal rights’’ in the Bill of Rights’ (MM v MN (CC) para
[68], quoting S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para [144];
see also MM v MN (CC) paras [64], [65], [76]). It held that there is
clear potential for infringement of the rights to dignity and equality
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of wives in polygynous marriages, and that where a subsequent
customary marriage is entered into without the knowledge or
consent of the first wife, her right to equality with her husband is
‘completely undermined’ because she is unable to consider or
protect her position as regards her personal life, her sexual or
reproductive health and possible negative proprietary conse-
quences of the subsequent marriage (MM v MN (CC) paras
[71]–[73]; the quoted phrase appears in para [72]). In addition,
because of the highly personal and private nature of marriage, ‘it
would be a blatant intrusion on the dignity of one partner to
introduce a new member to that union without obtaining that
partner’s consent’ (MM v MN (CC) para [74]). Moreover, the
provisions of the Act must be read together with the Constitution
and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (MM v MN (CC)
para [76]). The majority pointed out that s 6 of the Act affords
equal status and capacity to spouses by providing that ‘[a] wife in
a customary marriage has, on the basis of equality with her
husband . . ., full status and capacity’. This equality includes
requiring the consent of both spouses to their marriage; consent
by the wife to the matrimonial property system that operates in
the marriage; and her full status and capacity in respect of the
personal consequences of the marriage (MM v MN (CC) paras
[13], [83]). The majority therefore concluded that the Act ‘is
premised on a customary marriage that is in accordance with the
dignity and equality demands of the Constitution’ (MM v MN (CC)
paras [13], [83]). Consequently, the rights to dignity and equality
demand that the first wife’s consent be required for the validity of
her husband’s subsequent customary marriage, and that the
subsequent marriage will be ‘invalid for non-compliance with the
Constitution’ if the first wife’s consent is not obtained (MM v MN
(CC) para [83]; see also para [85]). Therefore, ‘Xitsonga custom-
ary law must be developed, to the extent that it does not yet do
so, to include a requirement that the consent of the first wife is
necessary for the validity of a subsequent customary marriage’
(MM v MN (CC) paras [13], [75]; see also para [89]).
As M’s consent to N’s marriage to the deceased was never
obtained, N’s marriage was declared invalid and the appeal was
upheld (MM v MN (CC) paras [13], [87], [89]). The order of the
majority regarding the consent of the first wife was not made with
retroactive effect, since retroactivity might have unfairly preju-
diced parties to existing customary marriages (MM v MN (CC)
paras [13], [85], [89]). Due to concerns that the effect of the
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judgment might not become widely and promptly known, the
majority ordered wider publication and distribution of the order by
compelling the Registrar of the Constitutional Court to send a
copy and a summary of the judgment to Houses of Traditional
Leaders and the Minister for HomeAffairs with a request that they
distribute the judgment and summary in any way they deem
appropriate (MM v MN (CC) para [89]; the summary appears as
Annexure A to the judgment).
In a minority judgment, Zondo J agreed that the appeal should
be upheld, but for different reasons (MM v MN (CC) paras [90],
[131]). He held that M’s evidence before the High Court showed
that Xitsonga custom required a first wife’s consent for the validity
of her husband’s subsequent customary marriages (MM v MN
(CC) paras [104]–[108]). Jafta J delivered a further minority
judgment, in which Mogoeng CJ and Nkabinde J concurred. He
agreed that the appeal should be upheld (MM v MN (CC) para
[132]), but held that it was unnecessary to develop Xitsonga
customary law because there was sufficient evidence on record
to support M’s case (MM v MN (CC) paras [134]–[142], [152],
[153]). Development of Xitsonga law was also undesirable
because it had not been raised in either the High Court or the
Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court should not
deal with the development of customary law as a court of first and
last instance unless exceptional circumstances are present (MM
v MN (CC) paras [142], [143], [145]–[150], [154]–[156]).
The decision that the first wife’s consent is required for the
validity of her husband’s subsequent marriage is extremely
welcome. The order of the Constitutional Court specifically refers
only to Xitsonga law, but the statements in the majority judgment
on equality and dignity strongly suggest that the court will arrive
at the same conclusion in respect of other South African systems
of customary law that may not require the first wife’s consent.
Consequently, the de facto implication of the judgment is that the
consent of the first wife in any customary marriage is required for
her husband’s subsequent customary marriage.
Furthermore, this judgment eventually settles the issue of the
consequences of failure to obtain a court-sanctioned contract in
terms of s 7(6). Although the certainty provided by the judgment
is welcome, the decision may have the undesired consequence
that even fewer (if any) such contracts will in future be sought. It is
unclear how many husbands have obtained such contracts since
the coming into operation of the Act. The figures indicate that
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either none or three such contracts were registered between
1998 and 2009, while it should be obvious that more than three
polygynous customary marriages were concluded during that
time (JC Bekker & GJ van Niekerk ‘Broadening the divide
between official and living customary law Mayelane v Ngwen-
yama 2010 4 SA 286 (GNP); [2010] JOL 25422 (GNP)’ (2010) 73
THRHR 679, 683–4; Franny Rabkin ‘Judgment puts the validity of
Zuma’s marriages in doubt’, Business Day, 7 July 2010, available
at http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=13949,
accessed 31 January 2014.) Then again, it is also possible that the
decision may lead to more such contracts being obtained, because
first wives, who must now be informed of their husband’s planned
additional customary marriage, may make their consent to the
subsequent marriage subject to a court-sanctioned contract being
obtained. However, the latter scenario will eventuate only if the
current lack of knowledge about s 7(6) among the population is first
addressed.
In community of property
The unreported decision in Strydom v Engen Petroleum Ltd
was discussed in 2012 Annual Survey 370. The decision has
since been reported as Strydom v Engen Petroleum Ltd 2013 (2)
SA 187 (SCA). On Strydom, see also JC Sonnekus ‘Beskerming
vervat in die Wet op Huweliksgoedere 88 van 1984 — Vir wie?
Strydom v Engen Petroleum Ltd 2013 2 SA 187 (HHA)’ 2013
TSAR 544.
RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE
Hattingh and Others v Juta 2013 (3) SA 275 (CC) is an
unsuccessful appeal against an order of the Supreme Court of
Appeal regarding the eviction of occupiers from accommodation
on a farm. The family-law aspects of the decision of the Supreme
Court of Appeal were mentioned in 2012 Annual Survey 374. As
the case falls primarily within the ambit of property law, the
appeal is not discussed in any detail in this chapter. For purposes
of family law, the dictum of the Constitutional Court on the
meaning of the term ‘family’ in s 6(2)(d) of the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 should be noted. This section
provides that an occupier shall have the right to family life in
accordance with the culture of that family. The Constitutional
Court held that, in this context, the term ‘family’ should not be
limited to the nuclear family, since families come in different
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shapes and sizes (para [34]; see also Dawood v Minister of Home
Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of
Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) para [31]). The Constitutional
Court further held that the reference to ‘family life’ meant that,
despite living on somebody else’s land, the occupiers were
entitled to enjoy ‘as normal a family life as possible, having regard
to the landowner’s rights’ (para [35]; see also para [37]). In each
case, the extent of the family life that occupiers can enjoy
depends ‘upon striking a fair balance between enabling the
occupier to enjoy family life and enabling the owner of the land to
also enjoy his rights as owner of the land’ (para [36]; see also
paras [37], [39]). Therefore, ‘the occupier may not reside on the
landowner’s property with more family members than is justified
by considerations of justice and equity when the occupier’s right
to family life is balanced with the rights of the landowner’ (para
[40]).
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